Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1965

Florence E. Russell v. George M. Paulson, Jr.,
Administrator Fo the Estate of Sharon Mitchell,
Deceased, United Pacific Insurance Company, A
Corporation; Factory Mutual Liability Insurance
Company of America and Automobile Mutual
Insurance Company of America : Respondent's
Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Gary L. Theurer; Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Russell v. Paulson, No. 10385 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3659

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------------------

1

ARGUMENT ----------------------------------------------------------------------

5

POINT I. THE "OTHER INSURANCE PRO\'ISIONS E'\ THE TWO POLICIES ARE
CONFLICTING .. EXCESS" CLAUSES.
FACTORY MUTUAL CAN APPARENTLY
AVOID LIABILITY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHILE SHE OCCUPIED A CAR NOT OWNED BY A
"NAMED INSURED," AND UNITED PACIFIC COULD DISCLAIM LIABILITY
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS A "NAMED
INSURED" UNDER THE FACTORY
MUTUAL POLICY. THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS TO FIND UNITED PACIFIC HAS "PRIMARY" LIABILITY. ________

5

POINT TI. THE TWO CONFLICTING "EXCESS" OTHER INSURANCE CLAUSES
ARE MUTUALLY REPUGNANT BECAUSE THEY WOULD PRODUCE THE
ABSURD RESULT OF NEITHER INSURANCE COMPANY BEING LIABLE,
WHEREAS BOTH INSURERS WOULD
BE LIABLE IN THE ABSENCE OF THE
OTHER. THEREFORE BOTH "EXCESS"
CLAUSES ARE VOID AND OF NO EFFECT. ----------------------·------------·---------·-·------------------ 11
CONCLUSION -----·----------------------------------------·------------·------ 17

AUTHORITIES - CASES CITED

Air ~~~ns:.o~ Manufacturing Company, Calif. 1949
d 647 ---·-··--·-··--··--·------------------ ----

1:

Allstate vs. Atlantic National Insurance Company
202 F. Supp. 85 ------------------------------------ _________ '

1:

Arditi vs. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company, -------- Mo ......... , 31.5 S.W. 2d 736. 743 _

]I

Burcham vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange, ______ Iowa
........ , 121 N.W. 2d 500 ____________________________ _

I)

Cosmopolitan Mutual Insurance Co. vs. Continental
Casualty Co., 28 N.J. 554, 147 A. 2d 529, 69
ALR 2d 1115 ----------------------------------···--- ________________ __
Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation us. Fireman's Fund Insurance Group, 262 F. 2d 259 ___

li

Globe Indemnity Company vs. Estate of Abraham
Barker, 253 N.Y.S. 2d 170 __________________ ---------- .

r

Hartford Accident and Indemnity vs. Select Risk Mutual, 167 A. 2d 821 ----------------------------- --------- --- -

i:

Lamb-Weston, Inc. vs. Oregon Automobile l11sura11cc i:
Company, 219 Oregon llO, 341 P. 2d 110, 119 ·· -··
Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. vs. U.S.F. & G. Co.,
195 F. 2d 958 --------------------------------------- .. ------- ---· ·····
State Farm Insurance Company vs. Craig,
364 s.w. 2d 343 ··························---------. C ompany of H artford vs · Wells
Travelers I ndemmty
316 F. 2d 770 (7th Cir. 1963 )--------- - --- ---- -

!'.

1,

TEXTS

Page

69 ALR 2d 1122, "Apportionment of liability between
)iahility insurers each of whose policies provides
that 1t- shall he 'excess' insurance ----------------------------

8

Section 202 "Automobile
- ----------------------------------------------------------------

11

10 ,\111. fur. 643, Section 2.59, "Insurance"________________________

6

Law Review 838 ( 1954)____________________________

14

7 Am ]ur 2d 544-5,

Insurance"

:38 1Hin11..:sota

STATUTES

ctah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 41-12-l(k)____________

5

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52( a)--------------------

5

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
I LORENCE E. RUSSELL,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs. -

LEOHGE M. PAULSON, JR.,
Administrator of the Estate of
SHARON MITCHELL, Deceased,
l 1NITED PACIFIC INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation; FACTORY
~!UTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA, a corporation,
and AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF
A\1ERICA, a corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case
No. 10385

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As in the brief of defendants and appellants, the same
de~ignations of the parties will be used for convenience
in this brief of plaintiff and respondent.
Defendants and
•ppellants, Factory Mutual Liability Insurance Company
ut America and Automobile Mutual Insurance Company
Df America, will be considered one insurance company
;1iJ will be referred to either as "Factory Mutual" or as
1

"the plaintiff's insurance company." The other 1·nsllrar
company involved and named as a defendant iI1 tli e CUI'.
below, namely, United Pacific Insurance Companv, will i
,
.
referred to as "'United Pacific" or as "the driver's• ·1·0 0111a1,
company."
··
The applicable insurance provisions involved are .
forth below for convenience, side by side:
FACTORY MUTUAL
(Plaintiff's Policy)

UNITED PACIFIC
(Driver's Policy)

PART IV - " " "
Uninsured Motorists
(Damages for Bodily Injury)

Damages for Bodily lnjun
Caused by
Uninsured Aut~mobilw

To pay all sums which the
insured or his legal representative shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily
injury, sickness or disease,
including death resulting
therefrom, hereinafter
called "bodily injury," sustained bv the insured,
caused by the accident and
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of
such uninsured automobile;
. . . (R. 9).

To pay all sums whiclnli'
insured or his legal reprt
sentatives shall be legalh
entitled to recover as dam
ages from the owner or or
erator of an uninsured aut~
mobile because of bodih
injury, sickness or disea•1
including death resultin'.
therefrom, hereinaltf
called "bodily injury," .111·
tained by the insure,'
caused bv accident and an
ing out 'of the om1erslui
maintenance or use ol 011 '
uninsured automobile: .
( R. 32 ) .

Definitions - Insured.

Definitions - Insured.
The unqualified word i:
sured" means
( 1) the named msnr1''
as stated in the policy :lf".
any person designaten

The definitions under Part
I, except the definition of
"insured," apply to Part IV,
and under Part IV:
"insured,, means:
2

named insured in the schedule and, while residents of
the same household, the
spouse of any such named
insured and relatives of
either; provided, if the
named insured as stated in
the policy is other than an
individual or husband and
wife who are residents of
the same household, the
named insured for the purposes of thi~; endorsement
shall be only a person so
designated in the schedule;

· · · the named insured
~ 111 d .un relative;
\d

J

' b) any, o the r person
I
hilf occupying an insured
.,1t1in1obile; and

,
1

i c i any person, with re)pcct to damages he is eniitlcd to recover for care or
lo\s of services because of
i1uJih injury to which this
cn1erage applies.

This insurance afforded
1rnder Part IV applies sep,1rately to each insured, but
the inclusion herein of more
tha11 one insured shall not
operate to increase the limit> of the company's liabil-

(2) any other person
while occupying an insured
automobile; and
( 3) any person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover for care or
loss of services because of
bodily injury to which this
endorsement applies.

(Emphasis added. )
IR. 9).

Il).

The insurance applies
separately with respect to
each named insured under
this endorsement and residents of the same household, but neither this provision nor application of the
insurance to more than one
insured shall operate to increase the limits of the company's liability.
(R. 32).
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Other Insurance.

Other lnsmancc.

With respect to bodily
injury to an insured while
occupying or through being
struck by an uninsured automobile, if such insured is
a named insured under other similar insurance available to him, then the damages shall be deemed not to
exceed the higher of the
applicable limits of liability
of this insurance and such
other insurance, and the
company shall not be liable
under this Part for a greater
proportion of the applicable
limit of liability of this Part
than such limit bears to the
sum of the applicable limits
of liability of this insurance
and such other insurance.
(Emphasis added. )
(R. 10).

With respect to bodih IL
jury to an insured 1\HJ
occupying or thro11gh hfi~:
struck by an uninstll'ed au.
tomobile, if such insured,
a named insured under otl.
er similar insurance avmi
able to him, then the dam
ages shall be deemed not:
exceed the higher of the ar
plicable limits of liabilltr ,.
this insurance and such ott
er insurance, and the company shall not be habit
under this endorsement for
a greater proportion of tl1'
applicable limit of liabiLr
of this endorsement thar1
such limit bears to the sur
of the applicable limit1 ni
liability of this insuranl'f
and such other insuran~·
(Emphasis added.)
(R. 33).

No insurance is involved in this litigation other tni:
the above uninsured motorist coverages (UMC). Bo\·
policies have reference to occupants of the same vehid·
Plaintiff was a passenger in the car insured by Unite·
Pacific. Said car was driven by the wife of the insure'.
of United Pacific. Sharon Mitchell, the driver of the otk
vehicle was killed in the collision. It is agreed that Shari"
Mitchell was an uninsured motorist at the time. (R E
The reference by appellants to Utah's financial reip:·,
sibility laws is immaterial because the limits of lrnhw

4

(ll bnth Factory Mutual and United Pacific were established
hi contract ( R 7 and R. 32), and not by Section 41-12-1 ( k),
l CA 195:3. However, although immaterial, it is interesting

remember that when the collision herein involved oc,11rrcd 011 April 4, 1961, the 1961 regular session of the
Lc~islature had already approved an amendment to incr~a1r the statutory limits of financial responsibility from
SiilOO 00 to $10,000.00 for "bodily injury or death of one
pmu11. in any one accident." (See 1965 pocket Supp.,
Section 41-12-1, UCA 19.53).

1,,

\\'ith reference to appellants' comment, (page 5, Appellants' Brief), that no findings of fact were made by the
trial court none are necessary when a motion for summary

udgmcnt is granted under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
1

The definitions of the Factory Mutual policy under
Part IV ( UMC) incorporate by reference the definitions
under Part I, except the definition of "insured" ( R. 9).
Tlie Part I definition reads, in part, as follows:
Ddinitions
Under Part I:
"named insured" means the individual named in
Item 1 of the declarations and also includes his
spouse, if a resident of the same household . . ."
(R. 8).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE "OTHER INSURANCE PROVISIONS IN
THE TWO POLICIES ARE CONFLICTING
''EXCESS" CLAUSES. FACTORY MUTUAL

5

CAN APPARENTLY AVOID LIABILITY BE.
CAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHILE
SHE OCCUPIED A CAR NOT OWNED BY
A "NAMED INSURED," AND Ul\'iTED PACIFIC COULD DISCLAIM LIABILITY BECAUSE
PLAINTIFF '"AS A "NAMED INSURED" UN.
DER THE FACTORY i\1UTUAL POLICY.
THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS TO FIND
UNITED PACIFIC HAS "PRIMARY' LIABILITY.
The rule that a policy or contract of insuranct i,
to be construed liberally in favor of the insured ani
strictly against the insurer is based upon variom
reasons. The one most frequently advanced is tli~i
an insurance contract, like any written agreement
should, in case of doubt as to the meaning thereof.
be interpreted against the party who has drawn 11
and is responsible for the language employed thm
in. Other reasons mentioned are that a liberal cor,
struction in favor of the insured is most conducirt
to trade and business and, moreover, probably mo~t
consonant with the intention of the parties; and tha1
in accord with the presumed intention of the parie,
the construction should be such as not to defeat
without the plain necessity, the insured's claim t:
the indemnity which it was his object to secure ar.~
for which he paid a premium. ( 29 Am. Jur. 6+)
Section 259, "Insurance.")
There is nothing in the record concerning any settlr
ment by plaintiff with United Pacific, and appellant is ill
accurate when it argues that United Pacific "has acknow!
edged that it is the primary carrier and that it was directl"
liable for the loss" (Appellants' Brief), or else it would 110'
have settled with plaintiff. (Appellants' Brief, pages 3, ]J
15.) It is apparent that under both policies tlw insurw.
agreements on their face both apply to cover the dama~·
plaintiff incurred. This is why Factory Mutual clam
1
'

6

was other insurance covering plaintiff's loss, and that
:b polic~ afforded only "excess" coverage because plaintiff
i1<l> injured while occupying an automobile not owned by
"named insured." In other words, Factory Mutual claims
1
l\
ld not be liable until the limits of the United Pacific
11 011
polin had been reached. If literal effect were to be given
hillh. policies, the result would be that neither insurance
,ompany could he liable to plaintiff, because United Pacific
c,iuld also claim it had no liability until the limit of the
fa:tory Mutual policy was reached because plaintiff was
at the same time a "named insured under other simiwr in1uraHce," namely under the Factory Mutual policy. In
other words, such a result would be absurd.
tki('

Respondent desires to clarify how both policies referred
to the plaintiff and respondent. We disagree (as alleged
]J, appellant) that plaintiff "was an insured, though not
1 named insured, under her husband's policy with Factory
\lutual" (Appellants' Brief, page 3). We disagree because
the defiinitions incorporated by reference under the UMC
definitions set forth above specify that the same definition
of "named insured" under Part I, also applies to UMC. One
1uch de~nition so incorporated is that:
"named insured" means the individual named in
Item 1 of the declarations and also includes his
spouse, ..." (Emphasis supplied.) ( R. 9.)
The two "Other Insurance" clauses above quoted, as well
as those at page 4 of Appellants' Brief, are identical to
each other in every material way, but appellant quotes only
tl1e "excess" clause that, on its face, excepts Factory Mutual
from liability to plaintiff; it ignores the conflicting "excess"
clause quoted on page 4 of this brief that, also on its face,
iclieves United Pacific from any obligation to pay plaintiff

7

for her injuries. Here is the irreconcilable conflict I)e tll'rt'
the two policies that makes both "excess" clauses void.

Tl,~~ Unite,~ Pacific \driver's) P,~licy included plaint'.',
as an
msured because it covered ( 2) Any other per11J.
•
while occupying an insured automobile" ( R. :32 ). T\1,
Factory Mutual policy covered plaintiff as " (a) the name
insured and any relative." ( R. 9).
1 ,

It must be observed that there is no reference in tf.
UMC insuring clause ( R. 9, Part IV, first paragraph), limi: '
ing the insurer's liability to an insured while occupying a;
owned automobile or an insured automobile as those tem
are defined. To the contrary, said UMC insuring clau~ ,
covenants to pay its insured and its named insured \ includ
ing a spouse) ... "all sums which the insured ... sl1~: ·
be . . . entitled to recover . . . from the owner or operat0: ,
of an uninsured automobile ... arising out of the ... u•: :
of such uninsured automobile." (Emphasis added. R. ~ :

!

All cases cited by Factory Mutual that do not invoh:
two conflicting "excess" clauses can be distinguished ~m::
discarded as inapplicable. The cases are collected in
annotation at 69 ALR 2d 1122, entitled "Apportionm1''
of liability between liability insurers, each of whose polit11
provides that it shall be 'excess' insurance." ThP leadU.'
case preceding this annotation is Cosmopolitan Mut1wl I ,
surance Co. vs. Continental Casualty Co., 28 N. J. 55-l. Ii'
A 2d 529, 69 ALR 2d 1115 decided in 1959, which stt·
at 69 ALR 2d 1119:
i

Where problems of conflicting "other insurancr i
provisions have arisen, many courts appear toht·.·.
assumed that one, but not both, of such prmJ)•
must yield in order to establish one policy as u:·
"primary" insurance upon which the "other m,1.
11
ance" provision of the "secondary" policy might i

8

eratc .... Based upon this premise the courts have
developed many varied and irreconcilable tests for
determinin~, which policy is "primary" and which
"secondary.
The basic argument of Factory Mutual is that it should
not be liable because United Pacific has settled with plaintiff and that this proves United Pacific had "primary" liahilitv. It is more logical and reasonable to assume that
Cllited Pacific recognized the general rule that both companies were liable and it desired to avoid the long and
costly litigation that Factory Mutual has persisted in pursuing. No inference can ever be drawn from a compromise
1ettlement. This is a fundamental principle that needs no
citation of authority.
Cosmopolitan discusses and rejects the arguments that have
been made attempting to establish one carrier's liability as
"primary." A11 are rejected (citing authorities), as follows:
( l) the "primary" policy is the one issued first in time
(page 119, 69 ALR 2d); ( 2) the "primary" policy was
issued to the tortfeasor (page 1120); ( 3) the "primary"
policy has more specific coverage (page 1120); ( 4) the
"'primary" policy is the one issued to the vehicle owner
(page 1120).
At page 1121 of 69 ALR 2d, Cosmopolitan squarely
answers an argument similar to Factory Mutual and winds
the whole matter up as follows:

If we should accept plaintiffs contention that the
owner's policy is primary, we would be compelled
to completely disregard the excess clause of that
policy .... There is no reason to give absolute effect
to a provision in one policy while ignoring a similar
provision in the other. Both clauses should occupy
the same legal status.
9

~~ applie? to the facts of the present casr, boil,
policies provide that they shall be "excess" insuran
Cc
. is
. ob v10us
.
H owever, it
t J1at t h ere can be no ''exc
·
, e11
insurance in the absence of "primary" insuranc:·
Since,, neither
policy • by its terms is a policv~ of "p11...
•
!:1ary ~;i~urance, neither can op_erate as a polic)' nt
excess msurance. The excess msurance provision,
are mutually repugnant, and as against each other
are impossible of accomplishment. Each prol'isini!
becomes inoperative in the same manner that such a
provision is inoperative if there is no other insurance
available. Therefore, the general coverage of eacl:
policy applies and each company is obligated t0
share in the cost of the settlement and expense;
We think that such a conclusion affords the onh
rational solution of the present dispute.

Actually, the most difficult unresolved problem prt·
sented by cases involving two insurance policies, each of
which has a conflicting "excess" clause, is not whether lin·

bility exists under both; it is what method shall be used
to apportion the loss between the two insurers. Under the
facts of the instant case, there is no problem of prope1
apportionment because only one insurance company i·
before the court; and, in any event, the limits of liabilih
of the two policies were both $5,000.00 and the judgment
entered by the court against the uninsured motorist's administrator is for $11,285.66, $5,000.00 of which was or·
dered to be paid by Factory Mutual (R. 46-47).
The following also conclude, as is contended by plailitiff, that where two automobile insurance policies seek 1
be "excess" over any other, that neither policy was "pn
mary," and that each policy, regardless of its limits anrl
11
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tht· differences, shared the liability equally to the limits

llf the respective policies:

Allstate vs. Atlantic National Insurance Company,
202 F. Supp. 85.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity vs. Select Risk
Mutual, 167 A. 2nd 821.
State Farm Insurance Company vs. Craig, 364 SW
2d, 343.

There is no rational basis to find that United Pacific
ha~ "primary" liability.
POINT II
THE TWO CONFLICTING "EXCESS" OTHER
INSURANCE CLAUSES ARE MUTUALLY REPUGNANT BECAUSE THEY WOULD PRODUCE THE ABSURD RESULT OF NEITHER
INSURANCE COMPANY BEING LIABLE,
WHEREAS BOTH INSURERS WOULD BE LIABLE IN THE ABSENCE OF THE OTHER.
THEREFORE BOTH "EXCESS" CLAUSES ARE
VOID AND OF NO EFFECT.
The best view of the "forest" instead of the "trees"
nn this question is afforded by the analysis in 7 Am. Jur.
2d .5.54-5, Section 202, "Automobile Insurance," concerning
Conflicts in 'Other Insurance' Clauses in Separate Policies":
Many cases have arisen involving conflicts between insurance policies both of which purport to
restrict or escape liability for a particular risk in the
event that there is other insurance. Such conflicts
have arisen, under automobile liability policies covering the same risk, in the following situations: (I)
where one of the policies contains an "excess insur-

11

ance" clause and the other contains a "pro rata
clause; ( 2) where one of the policies contains .
,,
.
'' l
dl1
e~cess msurance c ause and the other a "no liabili.
ty clause; ( 3) where both of the policies c<mtaii
an "excess insurance" clause; ( 4) where one of th;
policies contains a "pro rata" clause and the other
contains a "no liability clause; and ( 5) where a ··110
liability" clause expressly designates the types of
insurance with which it might conflict.

In the third situation mentioned aboue - thb ii.
where two or more policies provide coverage for tht
particular event and all the policies in question contain "excess insurance" clauses - it is generally held
that such clauses are mutually repugnant and must
be disregarded, rendering each company liable for
a pro rata share of the judgment or settlement, since
if literal effect were given to both "excess insurance
clauses of the applicable policies, neither policr
would cover the loss and such a result would produce
an unintended absurdity. In most of these cases,
proration has been ordered in accordance with the
proportionate policy limits afforded by the respectire
insurers, but this is not the universal holding. It has
also been held that the insurer should be treated on
an equal footing and required to bear equal sham
of the loss. (Emphasis added. )
In Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. 1). U. S. F. & G. Co., 195 Fed
2d 958, 960, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir·
cuit, held:
The two policies appear to us to be equally spr·
cific and no difficultv whatever should be cncoim·
tered in applying either to the facts if the other ~id
not exist. It is true that the U. S. F. & G. polici
named Suter as the insured, and it was Suter's neg·
ligence that caused the accident. But Oregon's poli~i
insured any person who might drive a car of tit
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HP<lmond Motor Company with the latter's consent,
and, as seen, Suter is an insured in this category.
In our opinion the "other insurance" provisions
of the two policies are indistinguishable in meaning
an<l intent. One cannot rationally choose between
them. We understand the parties to concede that
where neither policy has an "other insurance" provision, the rule is to hold the two insurers liable to
prorate in proportion to the amount of insurance
provided by their respective policies. Here, where
both policies carry like "other insurance" provisions,
we think must be held mutually repugnant and hence
be disregarded. Our conclusion is that such view
affords the only rational solution of the dispute in
this case. The proration is to be applied in respect
both of damages and of the expense of defending
the suits.
The holding of the Oregon Supreme Court in LambWeston, Inc. vs. Oregon Automobile Insurance Company,
219 Ore., 110, 341 P. 2d 110, 119, is even more impressive
because it involved a conflicting "excess" clause and a "prorata" clause and the two are still determined to be conflicting, repugnant and void, resulting in liability on the part
of both insurance companies, despite the general rule that
the "excess" clause will be recognized.
At page 119 of 341 P. 2d, the comt concludes:
The "other insurance" clause of all policies are
but methods used by insurers to limit their liability,
whether using language that relieves them from all
liability (usually referred to as an "escape clause")
or that used by St. Paul (usually referred to as an
"excess clause") or that used by Oregon (usually
referred to as a "prorata clause"). In our opinion,
whether one policy uses one clause or another, when
any come in conflict with the "other insurance"
clause of another insurer, regardless of the nature
13

,
of the clause, they are in fact repugnant and ~
should be rejected in toto. Sec Minnesota Lawe~
view, supra. (Emphasis added.)
e
The Law Review article citation is 38 Minnesota Law Re.
view 838 ( 1954), and is an excellent treatise on this subject
The rationale of Arditi vs. Massachusetts Bonding &
Insurance Company, ------------ Mo. ------------, 315 S.W. 2d 736
743, stating the Missouri rule, could apply also to Utah: .
. . . The parties agree that this question ha)
never been decided in Missouri and our conclusion
is that we should follow the rule stated in Oregon
Auto Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranti
Co., 9 Cir., 195 F. 2d 958, 960, as follows: "In olli
opinion the 'other insurance' provisions of the two
policies are indistinguishable in meaning and intent
One cannot rationally choose between them. We
understand the parties to concede that where neither
policy has an 'other insurance' provision, the rule ~
to hold the two insurers liable to prorate in proportion to the amount of insurance provided by theii
respective policies. Here, where both policies cam
like 'other insurance' provisions, we think (they)
must be held mutually repugnant and hence be di1
regarded."
All authorities cited by appellant can be readily db·
tinguished. Travelers Indemnity Company of Hartford 1•1
Wells, 316 Fed. 2d 770 (7th Cir., 1963) does not specih
whether two conflicting "excess" clauses were involved
and it is submitted that either this question was not pre·
sented to the court, or as is more likely, only one and 001
two clauses were involved. The Virginia law also impos~
a statutory limit for uninsured motorist coverage, and ili<
court felt judgment should not be entered in excess of ilir
statutory amount. This condition does not exist in Uta!
14

Globe Indemnity Company vs. Estate of Abraham Barker, 253 N. Y. S. 2d 170 (incorrectly cited as 25 N. Y. S. 2d)
correctly holds that where an insured is injured by an uninsured motorist while a named insured, the insured's insurance is only excess insurance. This is a proper exclusion
~tpplying to a person occupying an automobile not driven
bv the owner or his relatives, and it has no application to
tl~c case at bar because here the driver was a named insured under her United Pacific policy. The situation in this
New York case would have been duplicated in the case
at bar if plaintiff had been riding with a driver who was
not a named insured.
Burcham vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange, __________ Iowa
.. _______ , 121 N. W. 2d 500 cited by appellant as applying the
same rule as the Globe Indemnity case, actually involves a
"pro rata" clause versus an "excess" clause, and the court
recognizes the excess clause in accordance with the general
rule.

Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation vs. FireFund Insurance Group, 262 F. 2d 239 (inadvertently
cited as page 259) does not involve two "excess" clauses
hut involves a claim case where the Borrower's policy was
'excess" and the Lender's policy was primarily liable. The
instant case does not involve the loan of a car.
mans'

Air Transport Manufacturing Company, Calif., 1949,
204 P. 2d 647, also cited by appellant involves a "pro rata"
clause and has no application here.
Appellant also claims that plaintiff will receive a double
recovery. Plaintiff was damaged in excess of $10,000 and
is otherwise entitled to recovery under both policies. How
ean this constitute a double recovery when her damages
are greater than the sum of the face amount of both poli15

cies? Our understanding of double recovery is limited ti,
cases where twice the amount of the loss is recouped. Thii
would be inequitable and improper; but such is not the
case here. To allow Factory Mutual to escape liability to
plaintiff under the plain intendment of its insuring clansei
might more properly be called an unjust enrichment Uli
the part of Factory Mutual.
Some attempt is also made by appellant to distinguisn
plaintiff's authorities as only involving disputes between
two insurance companies as to whom is liable. No proper
distinction can be drawn from this fact. The same prin·
ciples are involved in either instance and it cannot be
presumed that any court would apply one set of principle>
to insurance companies that were parties litigant, and an·
other to the controversy between an insured and her insurer.
Appellant also contends that there is a distinction be
tween the case at bar and the authorities relied on b)
plaintiff that the latter primarily involve two insurance poll·
cies written on the same automobile. That there is no ba5i>
in such a distinction is imediately apparent. More argu·
ments can be made for "primary" liability existing under
plaintiff's policy than there would be under that of United
Pacific, which is the driver's policy. The collected case>
overwhelmingly support the doctrine that two conflictin~
"excess" clauses, both of which appear applicable, are mu
tually repugnant and are of no effect.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has hen injured by an uninsured motorist in
an amount in excess of $10,000.00, the combined uninsured
motorist coverages of United Pacific and Factory Mutual.
There is no rational basis to find that United Pacific had
primary" liability and that Factory Mutual had no liability
where both insurance companies had inconsistent "excess"
clauses in effect with respect to the existence of other inqirance, making said other insurance provisions repugnant
and of no force or effect. The trial court's decision awarding plaintiff summary judgment for $5,000 against Factory
Mutual should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
WAYNE C. DURHAM and
GARY L. THEURER
428 American Oil Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

17

